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I. INTRODUCION: ASSISTING THE JURY wrn- EXPERT TESTIMONY
As the subject matter of civil litigation becomes more technical and
complex,' the importance of expert testimony as a tool in litigation will
likely increase. The need for a complete and thorough understanding of
the permissible uses of such testimony will also increase, as expert testimony
grows in importance. Further, the need to evaluate restrictions on the use
of expert testimony, in light of potential harms and benefits, and the
purpose of the restrictions, also expands.
This Comment will review some of the limitations Missouri courts
have placed on the use of expert testimony.2 Upon examination, it becomes
clear that many of the traditional limitations cannot be justified on the
basis for which expert testimony is allowed: to assist the jury.8 Rather,
many courts have justified the limitations based on a fear of expert wit-
nesses and the influence they could have on juries.
As a general rule, expert testimony is admitted when it is necessary
1. Litigation in many areas can become extremely complex. Some recent
cases have been found to be so complicated that they were not allowed to be tried
before a jury. See I.L.C. Peripherals v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 447 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (antitrust litigation); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 65-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (antitrust litigation); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75
F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (securities litigation), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th
Cir. 1979); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash.
1976) (securities litigation).
2. The admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts differs in some
respects from its admissibility in Missouri state courts. Admissibility of expert
testimony in the federal courts is controlled by FED. R. EviD. 701-706. The pri-
mary' distinction in the use of expert testimony between the two systems is that
hypothetical questions are not required in federal courts. See Fr. P. Evm. 705,Notes of Advisory Committee.
3. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967); Schears
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. En Basic 1962); Giambelluca v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 320 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Mo. 1959); Summers v. Tavern Rock
Sand Co., 315 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Mo. 1958); Benjamin v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 133
Mo. 274, 288-89, 34 S.W. 590, 593 (1896). See also FED. R. Evw. 702.
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to assist the jury in making conclusions based on the facts.4 As the Missouri
Supreme Court noted in Young v. Wheelock,5 "One test of whether opin-
ions of experts should be received 'is whether the court or jury will be
aided by receiving such evidence.'-6 Despite the Missouri Supreme Court's
statement in Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co.7 that "the essential test
of the admissibility of expert opinion evidence is whether or not it will
be helpful to the jury, 8 courts often have ruled on the propriety of allow-
ing expert testimony without reference to this test.9 Instead, these courts
have discussed more narrow considerations such as the educational training
of the alleged expert,o the complexity of the subject matter of the testi-
mony," and the requirements of a hypothetical question.' 2 While these
considerations are relevant, case law indicates that too much emphasis has
been placed on these secondary questions and the ultimate test of whether
the testimony will assist the jury often remains unconsidered.
Limitations on the use of expert testimony can be divided into three
groups: 13 (1) limitations based on the qualifications of the expert; (2) lim-
itations based on the subject matter of the testimony; and (3) limitations
based on the foundation of the testimony. An examination of these cate-
gories will provide a framework of analysis for attorneys in preparing for
litigation and also should serve as a tool in evaluating the limitations on
the use of expert testimony traditionally used by Missouri courts.
II. QUALIFICATION OF EXPERT WrrINEssEs
The admission of the opinion of an expert witness is allowed as an
exception to the rule that a witness only can testify to facts. 14 The excep-
4. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Young'v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 1007, 64 S.W.2d 950, 957 (1933); Benjamin v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 133 Mo. 274, 288-89, 34 S.W. 590, 593 (1896).
5. 333 Mo. 992, 64 S.W.2d 950 (1933).
6. Id. at 1007, 64 S.W.2d at 957.
7. 391 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1965).
8. Id. at 326.
9. Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963).
10.- See Cohen v. Archibald Plumbing & Heating Co., 555 S.W.2d 676, 681
(Mo. App-., K.C. 1977); Skelton v. General Candy Co., 539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1976); Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40, 43-44 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1967).
11. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Holtmeyer v.
Scherer, 546 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
12. See Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963); Sneed v.
Goldsmith, 343 S.W.2d 345, 351-52 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961).
13. A fourth possible category of limitations would include traditional evi-
dentiary objections including relevancy, materiality, hearsay, and speculation.
These objections will not be directly discussed in this Comment. Objections per-
taining to the speculative nature of particular testimony and to some hearsay
problems are related to the foundation requirements discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 89-141 infra.
14. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963); Schears v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. En Banc 1962); McKinley v. Vize, 563 S.W.2d
505, 508 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
1980]
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tion is made when necessary15 to aid the jury's understanding of the issues.
Therefore, before the opinion of a witness is admissible, the offering party
must qualify the witness as an expert.'8 An expert witness is one "who pos-
sesses superior knowledge respecting a subject about which persons having
no particular training are incapable of forming an accurate opinion."'17
This superior knowledge can be obtained by the witness in many ways, but
typically is gained through education,1 8 training,19 or experience.2 ° Wheth-
er a witness qualifies as an expert is left to the discretion of the trial court.2 -'
The question of who qualifies as an expert must be considered in light
of the subject matter at issue.22 An expert on one subject will not be al-
lowed to state an opinion on another subject on which he is not an expert.23
A question calling for such an answer would be objectionable because it
calls for an opinion of the witness on a subject in which he does not pos-
sess superior knowledge.2 4
When a witness possesses sufficient knowledge on a subject matter
to qualify him as an expert, challenges to his credentials based on his
relative expertise (i.e., in comparison to other experts) are limited to
arguments concerning the weight that the jury should give the testimony.25
15. See cases cited note 4 supra.
16. See Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 870 S.W.2d 887, 391 (Mo. 1963); Schears
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Skelton v. Gen-
eral Candy Co., 539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
17. Giambelluca v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 320 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Mo. 1959).
18. See Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 587-88 (Mo. En
Banc 1978) (economist); Holtmeyer v. Scherer, 546 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1976) (physicist); Griffin v. Evans Elec. Constr. Co., 529 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1975) (doctor).
19. See Crystal Tire Co. v. Home Serv. Oil Co., 525 S.W.2d 317, 823-24 (Mo.
En Banc 1975) (fire prevention specialist); West v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 372
S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo. App., K.C. 1963) (police officer), rev'd on other grounds,
381 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
20. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Kimmell, 435 S.W.2d 354,
857 (Mo. 1968) (real estate salesman); McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 482
S.W.2d 292, 299 (Mo. 1968) (fire chief); Cohen v. Archibald Plumbing & Heating
Co., 555 S.W.2d 676, 681-82 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977) (fireman); Skelton v. General
Candy Co., 539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976) (parking lot attendant);
Kim Mfg., Inc. v. Superior Metal Treating, Inc., 537 S.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1976) (business experience); Langdon v. Koch, 435 S.W.2d 780, 732-33 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1968) (used car salesman).
21. See Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co., 391 S.W.2d 315, 325 (Mo. 1965);
Yocum v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co:, 349 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Mo. 1961); Summers
v. Tavern Rock Sand Co., 815 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Mo. 1958); Skelton v. General
Candy Co., 539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Langdon v. Koch, 485
S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo. App., Spr. 1968).
22. For a discussion of the subject-matter limitations placed on expert testi-
mony, see text accompanying notes 37-45 infra.
28. On subjects outside his field of expertise, the expert is treated as any
other witness and is prohibited from stating his opinion. See cases cited note 11
supra.
24. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
25. See McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 432 S.W.2d 292, 299 (Mo. 1968);
Cohen v. Archibald Plumbing & Heating Co., 555 S.W.2d 676, 681-82 (Mo. App.,
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Medical expert testimony is exemplary; even though there are many
specialties within the profession, the courts generally have considered a
doctor to be a qualified expert in any of the specialties.2 6 As was stated
by the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Evans Electrical Con-
struction Co.,27 "[T]he extent of training, experience and competence of
a medical expert in the field in which he testifies goes to the weight to be
given to and not the admissibility of his testimony in that area, and thus
becomes a matter for the trier of the facts."2 8 It is difficult to measure the
amount of knowledge that a witness must possess to qualify as an expert
witness. Similarly, it is difficult to determine when an expert in one field
is qualified to testify in a related field or to determine what areas of exper-
tise are relevant to an issue.
Courts should resolve these difficult questions by inquiring into wheth-
er the witnesses' testimony would assist the jury. After all, the expert wit-
ness is allowed to give his opinion because it helps the jury. The expert
is exempted from the personal observation limitation on witnesses because
the expert assists the jury through his expertise and experience. A lay wit-
ness, in contrast, assists the jury by testifying to what he has personally
observed. Under a modified analysis of expertise, if the opinion testimony
of the alleged expert would assist the jury in making its decision, then
the expert should be allowed to testify (i.e., the witness should be found
sufficiently expert). On the other hand, if the opinion of the witness is
based on irrelevant 9 or insufficient information,3 0 or if the opinion is un-
necessary to the jury's determinations' (as adjudged by the trial court),
then the expert should not be allowed to testify. The focus under this test
would be on whether the witness' testimony could assist the jury, not on
the education or the number of years of experience that the witness has.
Of course, the training and education of a witness, as well as his experience,
26. See, e.g., Swope v. Printz, 468 S.W.2d 34, 40 (Mo. 1971); Griffin v. Evans
Elec. Constr. Co., 529 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975); Pate v. St. Louis
Indep. Packing Co., 428 S.W.2d 744, 750 (Mo. App., St. L. 1968); Sanguinett v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 228 Mo. App. 1161, 1170-71, 65 S.W.2d 162, 166 (St. L. 1933).
27. 529 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975).
28. Id. at 178.
29. For example, where the expert's opinion is based on facts other than
those presented in the case at bar, the opinion is based on irrelevant facts. See
text accompanying notes 94-100 infra. See also Odum v. Cejas, 510 S.W.2d 218,
222 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974).
30. The expert's opinion in this instance would be essentially conjecture.
See Craddock v. Greenberg Merc., Inc., 297 S.W.2d 541, 548 (Mo. 1957). See also
Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 587-88 (Mo. En Banc 1978); Mc-
Donald v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 401 S.W.2d 465, 469-70 (Mo. 1966); Harp
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963).
31. The evaluation would be an assessment of the relevance, cumulativeness,
and content of the testimony in light of the issues involved and the knowledge
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would influence the trial court's determination of admissibility by increas-
ing the likelihood that the witness' opinion would assist the jury.3 2
Emphasizing the ability of the witness to help the jury rather than
evaluating a possible expert in terms of a threshold level of competence,
would facilitate an attorney's evaluation of whether the witness would
be permitted to testify. Attorneys would do well to frame arguments
for or against expert status for a witness around the witness' ability to
assist the jury, rather than solely upon the qualifications of the witness.
Such an emphasis can minimize the effect of the cautious attitude that
courts have taken toward expert witnesses. Language used by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Superior Ice & Coal Co. v. Belger Cartage Service, Inc.83
points out this cautious attitude: " 'Expert witnesses are generally selected
by the parties from their known opinions on the subject in respect to which
they are called to testify, and therefore, in view of the important functions
they perform, their evidence should be admitted with great caution.' -4
This attitude taken by the courts appears to be founded in the manner
in which expert witnesses are selected. The attorney is forced to take lay
witnesses as they are found. He may choose to use or not use a lay wit-
ness and he may do so based on the witness' testimony; even so, the
pool from which the attorney makes his selection of witnesses necessarily
will be limited. Expert witnesses, while limited in number by the subject
matter at issue and the party's financial resources, are available in greater
numbers. The experienced attorney has a pool of experts from which to
choose in every case. If one expert in the pool cannot meet the attorney's
needs, often another will. This nature of control over the testimony of the
expert is lacking with respect to lay witnesses who simply happen to be
present at an incident which becomes the subject of litigation. It seems
that this element of control is at the root of the cautious attitude of the
courts.35 If emphasis in determining who qualifies as an expert were placed
upon the ability of the witness to assist the jury, fears of the courts could
be relieved and many potential abuses of expert testimony could be avoided.
32. The knowledge possessed by the expert would be one factor that could
influence the determination of whether the testimony would assist the jury.
33. 337 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1960).
34. Id. at 906 (quoting Cole v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 381 Mo. 824, 888, 55
S.W.2d 434, 438 (1982)).
35. Because experts are selected on the basis of their known opinions and
because the same pool of experts is available to attorneys in every case they handle
in a certain area (or of a certain variety), the cautious attitude may be well
founded. Query whether a significant increase in litigation in a certain field coupled
with an overall increased reliance on expert testimony could result in a career
expert witness. If so, would that be desirable? If the testimony of the expert is
based on accurate data and the opinion is given "honestly," has harm occurred
where the jury adopts the expert's opinion? These questions certainly are not
easily answered, yet answering them may be necessary to properly evaluate the
desirability of increased reliance on expert testimony. Some have suggested court-
appointed experts as a desirable alternative. See C. McCoRMicx, LAW oF EvmxIcE
§§ 16-17 (2d ed. 1972). See also FED. R. Evm. 706.
[Vol. 45
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With emphasis placed on the ability of the witness to assist the jury
by adding to the body of information from which it can draw in rendering
its decision, the arguments over how much superior knowledgeU is enough
to qualify for expert status can be avoided. Furthermore, the determination
by the trial court of when expert testimony will be allowed then will be
based on a criterion directly related to the purpose for allowing expert
testimony. Attorneys can use the test both in assessing a witness' likelihood
of being allowed to testify as an expert and in forming their arguments
for or against a witness' expert status. Finally, the abuses of expert testi-
mony feared by the courts can be minimized by emphasizing specifically
what the witness can add to the trial, and de-emphasizing a witness' train-
ing or experience prior to trial.
III. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The admissibility of expert testimony on an issue depends on the
ability of the jury to understand the issue without the aid of an expert a2
Expert testimony will not be admitted when the jury can reach an accurate
conclusion on the facts without the aid of an expert witness.38 Conversely, if
an ordinary and reasonable jury will be unable to comprehend an issue
without the assistance of expert testimony, expert testimony often is re-
quired.39 When issues of fact fall between the instances in which expert
testimony is required and those in which it is prohibited, expert testimony
is permitted but not required.40
The line separating situations in which expert testimony is permitted
and those in which it is prohibited or required has not been clearly drawn
in Missouri. 41 In general, the determination of when an issue is suitable
86. That is, how much education, training, or experience qualifies a witness
as an expert? See cases cited notes 18-20 supra.
87. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 870 S.W.2d 887, 391 (Mo. 1963); Schears v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 855 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Superior Ice & Coal Co. v.
Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 337 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Mo. 1960); Giambelluca v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 320 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Mo. 1959). See also Cole v. Empire Dist.
Elec. Co., 831 Mo. 824, 833, 55 S.W.2d 484, 438 (1932); Benjamin v. Metropolitan
St. Ry., 183 Mo. 274, 288-89, 84 S.W. 590, 593 (1896); McKinley v. Vize, 563 S.W.2d
505, 508 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40,
43-44 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967).
88. See Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. En Banc
1978); Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co., 802 S.W.2d 924, 930 (Mo. En Banc 1957);
Young v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 1007-08, 64 S.W.2d 950, 957 (1933); Wood v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 181 Mo. 433, 449-50, 81 S.W. 152, 156 (1904); Gavisk v.
Pacific R.R., 49 Mo. 274, 275-76 (1872); Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 785
(Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
89. See Pedigo v. Roseberry, 840 Mo. 724, 734, 102 S.W.2d 600, 606 (1937);
Young v. Wheelock, 333 Mo. 992, 1007-08, 64 S.W.2d 950, 957 (1933); Ponciroli v.
Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
40. See Pedigo v. Roseberry, 840 Mo. 724, 734, 102 S.W.2d 600, 606 (1937).
41. See text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
1980]
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for expert testimony is made by the trial court.4 2 A significant amount of
discretion is given the trial judge in this regard.42 Missouri decisions have
indicated that expert testimony is not admissible where a juror is capable
of rendering an intelligent decision without expert assistance.4 4 If the
language of these decisions is taken literally, then the jury's inability to
understand an issue can be called a prerequisite to the use of expert opinion
evidence. As will be discussed later, some question exists as to whether such
a literal interpretation is warranted. 45
The Missouri Supreme Court first alluded to the prerequisite that a
juror must be incapable of rendering an intelligent decision without expert
assistance before the expert's testimony will be allowed in Benjamin v.
Metropolitan Street Railway:46
The witnesses, as a general rule, must state facts, from which
the jurors are to form their opinion. But when the facts are all
stated, upon a subject of inquiry, if an intelligent opinion cannot
be drawn there from by inexperienced persons, such as constitute
the ordinary jury, an exception is made to the general rule .... 47
A recent decision by the Missouri Supreme Court, Sampson v. Missouri
Pacific Railway,48 stated the rule more clearly: "The opinion of expert
witnesses 'should never be admitted unless it is clear that the jurors them-
selves are not capable, for want of experience or knowledge of the subject,
to draw correct conclusions from the facts proved.' 49
A number of subjects have been held to be inappropriate for expert
testimony because they were within the knowledge and abilities of the
average jury. These include: whether a fire started in combustible materials
can burst into flames after smoldering for many hours;5 0 whether a ramp
on which the plaintiff fell was the cause of the fall; 51 whether barricades
used around construction work were adequate to protect children who
might be in the area from being injured; 52 whether a wrist previously
broken would still exhibit weakness two weeks after the cast was removed; 55
42. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co., 391 S.W.2d 315, 325 (Mo. 1965); Yocum v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Mo. 1961); Superior Ice & Coal
Co. v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 337 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Mo. 1960).
43. See cases cited note 21 supra.
44. See cases cited notes 37 &c 38 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
46. 133 Mo. 274, 34 S.W. 590 (1896).
47. Id. at 288, 34 S.W. at 593.
48. 560 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
49. Id. at 586 (emphasis added) (quoting Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d
284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967)).
50. Superior Ice & Coal Co. v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 37 S.W.2d 897,
906 (Mo. 1960).
51. McClure v. Koch, 433 S.W.2d 589, 595 (Mo. App., St. L. 1968).
52. Anderson v. Cahill, 485 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. 1972).
53. Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 781, 735 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
[Vol. 45
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and the point of impact between two vehicles involved in a collision.54 In
Housman v. Fiddyment,5 5 expert testimony concerning the point of impact
between two vehicles was held not admissible because questions concerning
impact "do not involve an application of the principles of physics, engi-
neering, mechanics or other technical fields of science requiring specialized
information. These questions could be determined by jurors possessed of
the knowledge of ordinary men of the time." 56
It seems unlikely that a court would literally enforce the rule that
expert testimony cannot be admitted unless it is clear that the jury cannot
comprehend the subject matter. Such a rule assumes that whether the jury
is capable of arriving at a correct conclusion may be determined absolutely.
It seems more reali3tic to recognize that in some instances a jury may be
able to reach a correct conclusion entirely on its own but that with the
aid of expert testimony, the likelihood of a correct decision and the quality
of understanding that the jury has for the subject matter would increase.
The admission of expert testimony probably was not intended to be limited
to those instances in which there was no possibility that the jury could
draw a correct conclusion. A literal interpretation of the subject matter
limitations would create only two categories of subject matters: those on
which expert testimony is prohibited and those on which expert testimony
is required.
A 1937 opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court, Pedigo v. Roseberry,57
sets forth three categories of subjects for purposes of determining the ad-
missibility of expert testimony. Expert testimony on subjects in the first
category is prohibited, such testimony on subjects in the second category
is permitted, and expert testimony on subjects in the third category is
required.58
Expert testimony is prohibited when the subject matter at issue is
"within the experience and knowledge common to mankind in general." 59
On these subjects the jury is said to be as competent as the witness to draw
a conclusion based on the evidence. Under Pedigo, expert testimony on
second-category subjects is permissible if it will aid the jury in its conclu-
sions.6 0 Expert testimony is required on subjects in the third Pedigo cate-
54. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 290-91 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Butler v. Crowe, 540 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); Penn v. Hartman,
525 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975). But see Schneider v. Prentzler, 391
S.W.2d 307, 510 (Mo. 1965); Jones v. Smith, 372 S.W.2d 71, 78 (Mo. 1963); Ryan
v. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 304 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Mo. En Banc 1957); Holt-
meyer v. Scherer, 546 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976). See also Comment,
Expert Testimony in Missouri on Point of Impact in Automobile Accidents, 33
Mo. L. Rxrv. 645 (1968).
55. 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
56. Id. at 291-92. See also Holtmeyer v. Scherer, 546 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1976).
57. 340 Mo. 724, 102 S.W.2d 600 (1937).
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gory. These subjects are beyond the "general experience and common
knowledge of mankind." 61 Scientific experience or training, or other ex-
pertise is said to be indispensible to a proper determination of issues in-
volving these subject matters.6 2 The existence of three categories of subject
matter-prohibited, permissible, and required-seems more realistic than
attempting to utilize the two absolute classifications-prohibited and re-
quired-set forth by some Missouri decisions.63 Further, the three-category
system better achieves the purpose of expert testimony; it allows testimony
on subjects in the middle category when it will aid the jury. The language
in Pedigo seems to support the view that the narrow rule stated in some
Missouri decisions, setting forth only two categories of expert testimony,
should not be relied upon literally in determining the suitability of a
subject matter for expert testimony.
Even when the expert is permitted to testify, the content of his testi-
mony still may be restricted. Several justifications for subject matter limi-
tations exist. These justifications are based not only on a dislike of per-
sonally selected expert witnesses,6 4 but also on the opinionated nature of
expert testimony.
Expert testimony often contains the expert's conclusion based on the
facts of the case. When this occurs, the expert plays a role similar to that
of the jury. This is especially true when the testimony of the expert con-
cerns the ultimate issue of the lawsuit.65 The similarity of function between
an expert witness and the jury led many courts to limit the testimony of
an expert witness to statements of opinion.6 6 At one time, the courts re-
fused to allow experts to state conclusions, especially on the ultimate issue
of the lawsuit. 6t The rationale of the courts apparently was that testimony
by an expert as to his conclusion would invade the province of the jury.
A 1904 decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, Taylor v. Grand Avenue
Railway,68 noted that "[t]o the trained legal mind there is a very essential
difference between permitting an expert to give an opinion and permitting
him to draw a conclusion. The one is the province of a witness-the other
is, in the first instance the special prerogative of the jury."6 9
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
64. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
65. An example is where an expert testifies that the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by the incident and causation is the only qvestion at issue.
66. See State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 251-52, 136 S.W. 316, 381-32 (1911); Ros-
coe v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 202 Mo. 576, 595-96, 101 S.W. 32, 87 (1907); Taylor
v. Grand Ave. Ry., 185 Mo. 239, 255-57, 84 S.W. 878, 877-78 (1904). But see Wood
v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 181 Mo. 433, 449-52, 81 S.W. 152, 156-57 (1904).
67. See Gillmore v. Atwell, 288 S.W.2d 636, 689 (Mo. 1955); Mahany v.
Kansas City Rys., 286 Mo. 601, 620-21, 228 S.W. 821, 826 (1921); Henson v. Kansas
City, 277 Mo. 443, 455-56, 210 S.W. 18, 17 (1919); Deiner v. Sutermeister, 266 Mo.
505, 521-22, 178 S.W. 757, 761 (1915); Frangos v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
208 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. App., St. L. 1947). See also FED. R. Evm. 704.
68. 185 Mo. 239, 84 S.W. 878 (1904).
69. Id. at 256-57, 84 S.W. at 878.
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The fallacy of the "province of the jury" objection was recognized
long ago in Missouri case law, 70 but the objection has proven to be difficult
to lay aside. Litigants and courts still utilize the phrase in discussing the
permissible uses of expert testimony.71 In fact, courts continue to rely on
the objection in rendering decisions.7 2 Examination of modem limitations
on the subject matters on which expert testimony can be admitted reveals
that the limitations are derived from rules based on the fear that experts
invade the province of the jury.78
Recognizing the invalidity of the argument that allowing an expert
witness to testify to his conclusion invades the province the jury, the St.
Louis Court of Appeals in McKinley v. Vize74 stated summarily:
The province of the jury is to hear all the evidence, including
opinion evidence, to weigh it all, and to decide the issues. Thus an
opinion, which is evidence, cannot invade the province of the jury
in a strict sense, and this is so "even though the opinion is upon
the very issue to be decided," and for that reason "an objection
that an expert opinion invades the province of the jury is not a
valid one."'75
While the testimony of an expert dearly cannot invade the province of
the jury because the jury may still disbelieve and must evaluate all testi-
70. State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613, 623 (Mo. 1958); City of St. Louis v.
Kisling, 318 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo. 1958); Stephens v. Kansas City Gas Co., 354 Mo.
835, 849, 191 S.W.2d 601, 607 (1946); Mann v. Grim-Smith Hosp. & Clinic, 347 Mo.
348, 353, 147 S.W.2d 606, 608 (1941); Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277,
297, 100 S.W.2d 311, 322 (1937); Wood v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 181 Mo. 433, 449-
50, 81 S.W. 152, 156 (1904); Gillespie v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 204 S.W.2d 598, 604(Mo. App., K.C. 1947).
71. Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. En Banc
1978); Phillips v. Shaw, 381 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. 1964); McKinley v. Vize, 563
S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
72. Gillmore v. Atwell, 283 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Mo. 1955); Baptiste v. Boatmen's
Nat1 Bank, 148 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo. 1941); Mahany v. Kansas City Rys., 286
Mo. 601, 620, 228 S.W. 821, 826 (1921); Frangos v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 203 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. App., St. L. 1947).
A possible reason for some of these decisions is that they concern expert testi-
mony on legal conclusions. While discussion of an "invasion of the province of thejury" would be misguided, the exclusion of the testimony might be proper under a
factual conclusion-legal conclusion distinction. See Fields v. Luck, 44 S.W.2d 18,
20-21 (Mo. 1931); cases cited note 84 infra.
73. Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. En Banc 1978);
Phillips v. Shaw, 381 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. 1964); Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370
S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963); Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321(Mo. En Banc 1962); Superior Ice &= Coal Co. v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 337
S.W.2d 897, 906 (Mo. 1960); Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1978). See also Henson v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 443, 455-56, 210 S.W. 13, 17(1919); Deiner v. Sutermeister, 266 Mo. 505, 521-22, 178 S.W. 757, 761 (1915); State
v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 256-57, 136 S.W. 316, 333 (1911); Roscoe v. Metropolitan St.
Ry., 202 Mo. 576, 595, 101 S.W. 32, 37 (1907); Wood v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 181
Mo. 433, 451, 81 S.W. 152, 157 (1904); Benjamin v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 133 Mo.
274, 288-89, 34 S.W. 590, 593 (1896); Gavisk v. Pacific R.R., 49 Mo. 274, 276-77(1872).
74. 563 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
75. Id. at 510.
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mony, the fears upon which the objection was originally founded cannot
be so easily dismissed, and thus merit discussion.
Modem limitations imposed by the courts on the subject matter of
expert testimony still relate to fears of intrusion by experts on the role of
the jury. This was indicated in Harp v. Illinois Central Railroad.76 "As
an exception to the general rule that a witness may not express an opinion,
an expert witness may do so when qualified as such and when the subject
matter is not of such common knowledge to invade the province of the
jury."7 7 Thus, while modem courts have abandoned the opinion versus
conclusion distinction courts once used to protect the jury's role from in-
vasion by expert witnesses, the use of subject matter limitations to ac-
complish the same result are still permissible.78
It can be argued that even if an expert witness technically cannot
invade the province of the jury, juries may be prone to allow experts to
do so, and that juries might be inclined to adopt the opinions of expert
witnesses as their own, without any analysis or separate evaluation of the
facts.70 Whether or not juries actually tend to adopt the opinions of ex-
perts, proper instructions from the court could decrease the likelihood that
a jury passively would do so.80
Arguments which allege that the jury blindly will accept the opinions
of expert witnesses presuppose the existence of expert testimony only on
one side of the lawsuit. In cases where more than one party offers expert
testimony on an issue, the jury would be forced to make at least an assess-
ment of the credibility of the experts. Finally, even if juries tend to adopt
blindly the opinions of expert witnesses, it is questionable whether this
justifies the type of subject matter limitations presently utilized. A jury
would seem more likely to adopt the expert's opinion when the subject
matter is difficult and the jurors have no basis to reach a conclusion of
76. 370 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. 1963).
77. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
78. Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
See also cases cited note 73 supra.
79. See Roscoe v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 202 Mo. 576, 595, 101 S.W. 32, 37
(1907). The fear of blind acceptance is exemplified historically by a now overruled
restriction on the use of expert testimony to prove causation. Under the old rule,
experts were allowed to testify that a personal injury might be caused by an event
but not that the injury was so caused. The rule was based on a fear that the jury
would accept the testimony on causation without independently assessing the testi-
mony unless the term "might" was interjected. See State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200,
256-57, 136 S.W. 316, 333 (1911). But see Wood v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 181 Mo.
433, 451, 81 S.W. 152, 157 (1904). See also Expert Testimony on Causation in a
Wrongful Death Case: Should "Reasonable Medical Certainty" be Necessary
to Make a Submissible Case?, 36 Mo. L. REv. 127 (1971). On the issue of
causation, experts are now required to testify with reasonable certainty. See James
v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 364, 373 (Mo. 1966); Kinealy v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 368 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo. 1963).
80. See, e.g., Mo. APPRovED INSR. Nos. 2.01-.03, 3.01 (Supp. 1980). Query
whether an instruction specifically addressing expert witnesses and explaining their
role to the jury would be desirable. See Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 734, 102
S.W.2d 600, 606 (1937).
[Vol. 45
11
Harpool: Harpool: Limitations on the Use of Expert Testimony in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
LIMITATIONS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
their own. If so, then the courts' subject matter limitation is backwards,
for it prohibits expert testimony only when the propensity of a jury to
bypass its own evaluation is the lowest, i.e., when the subject matter is not
difficuIt.8 1
One limitation on the subject matter of expert testimony (beyond
the assistance to the jury test) appears justifiable. That limitation was de-
rived from the now abandoned opinion versus conclusion distinction.8 2
The distinction now drawn is between an expert testifying to factual con-
clusions and an expert testifying to legal conclusions.8 3 Even today, an
expert witness generally is not allowed to testify to a legal conclusion. 4 As
might be expected, it is sometimes difficult to distinquish between legal
conclusions and factual ones. 8 5 For example, on some international conflict
of laws questions, experts are allowed to testify as to the law of foreign
countries.88 In these instances, however, the law of the foreign jurisdiction
is treated as a factual question, for the jury to decide.8 7
If the courts abandon strict limitations on the subjects on which ex-
pert testimony is admissible based on the complexity of the issue involved,
then the problem of determining the scope of those limitations can be
avoided. In place of those limitations courts can inquire as to the ability
of each witness to assist the jury. Such an emphasis is consistent with the
purpose for which expert testimony is allowed. Further, outmoded objec-
81. If a fear of the jury blindly adopting an expert's opinion as its own were
the real basis for limiting the subjects on which experts can testify, then the
limitation should restrict testimony on those subjects for which blind acceptance
is most likely. Arguably the fear of blind acceptance makes more sense as a justifi-
cation for the court-imposed limitation when it is balanced with the value of the
testimony offered. On difficult subjects the testimony can be said to be of such
value as to outweigh the fear of blind acceptance. Such may not be true of less
difficult subject matters. To the extent that the propensity for a jury to accept
blindly an expert's opinion decreases as the subject matter becomes less difficult,
the validity of blind acceptance as a rationale for court-imposed limitations seems
dubious.
82. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
83. It is sometimes difficult to determine which questions are factual and
which are legal. It would seem that in most instances, opinions must necessarily
combine law and fact. Three subject matters causing the greatest problems in dis-
tinquising between law and fact are capacity, causation, and insanity. Cases which
have struggled with the concept of capacity include McGrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d
111 (Mo. 1962); Gillmore v. Atwell, 283 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1955); Baptiste v. Boat-
men's Nat'l Bank, 148 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1941); Fields v. Luck, 44 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.
1931); and Farrel's Adm'r v. Brennan's Adm'x, 32 Mo. 328 (1862). See also note 72
supra. For a discussion of the causation issue, see note 79 supra. The problems
associated with application of "legal" standards of insanity by nonlegally oriented
experts are well known to prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers.
84. City of St. Louis v. Kisling, 318 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo. 1958); Stephens v.
Kansas City Gas Co., 354 Mo. 835, 848-49, 191 S.W.2d 601, 606 (1946); Mann v.
Grim-Smith Hosp. & Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 353, 147 S.W.2d 606, 608 (1941); Cole
v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, 297, 100 S.W.2d 311, 321-22 (1937); Farrel's
Adm'r v. Brennan's Adm'x, 32 Mo. 328, 384 (1862).
85. See note 83 supra.
86. Robertson v. Stead, 135 Mo. 135, 143, 36 S.W. 610, 611 (1896).
87. Id. at 144, 36 S.W. at 612.
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tions to the use of expert testimony, based on the province of the jury,
would be put to rest. Finally, emphasizing the ability of the witness to
assist the jury would protect the judicial system from the abuses upon
which the province of the jury objections were originally founded.8 8
IV. THE FOUNDATION OF EXPERT TESTMONY
Most witnesses testify to facts known to them by personal observa-
tion.a9 Expert witnesses, however, are allowed to testify to their opinions
based on facts observed by them, 0 by other witnesses, 91 or based on a
combination of the two. 2 When expert witnesses base their opinions on
facts observed by others, or upon any fact not personally observed, these
facts must be presented to the expert by means of a hypothetical question.93
Before a fact can be included in a hypothetical question, there must
be an evidentiary basis for assuming the existence of the fact.9 4 Courts
often have stated that "[f]acts upon which an expert's opinion is based,
must measure up to legal requirements of substantiality and probative
force."' 95 It is error to include in a hypothetical question any fact that is
not supported by the record.96 For example, in Craddock v. Greenberg
88. These fears relate to the manner in which expert witnesses are selected
and a fear that the jury tends to accept expert opinions without independently
considering all the evidence. For a discussion of these fears, see text accompanying
notes 33 8& 34 supra (selection) and notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra
(blind acceptance).
89. See Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. En Banc 1967);
Benjamin v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 133 Mo. 274, 288-89, 34 S.W. 590, 593 (1896).
90. Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963); Schears v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Sneed v. Goldsmith,
343 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961).
91. Hornberger v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 353 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1962);
Craddock v. Greenberg Merc., Inc., 297 S.W.2d 541, 548 (Mo. 1957); Gavan v.
H.D. Tousley Co., 395 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965); cases cited note
90 supra.
92. Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967).
See also cases cited note 91 supra.
93. Klaesener v. Sclmucks Mkts., Inc., 498 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Mo. 1973); Harp
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. 1963); Schears v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Craddock v. Greenberg Merc.,
Inc., 297 S.W.2d 541, 548 (Mo. 1957); Gavan v. H.D. Tousley Co., 395 S.W.2d
266, 270 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965); Sneed v. Goldsmith, 343 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1961).
94. Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. En Banc 1978);
Crystal Tire Co. v. Home Serv. Oil Co., 525 S.W.2d 317, 324 (Mo. En Banc 1975);
Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Div. ACF Indus., Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 750 (Mo. 1968);
Hunter v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 315 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Mo. 1958); Heppner v. At-
chison, T. & S.F. Ry., 297 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Mo. 1956); Winters v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 554 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Gavan v. H.D. Tousley Co.,
395 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965).
95. Gavan v. H.D. Tousley Co., 395 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965).
Similar statements appear in Meier v. Moreland, 406 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. 1966);
Craddock v. Greenberg Merc., Inc., 297 S.W.2d 541, 548 (Mo. 1957); Dolan v. D.A.
Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967). See also cases cited note
84 supra.
96. Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Mo. 1963); Hornberger
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 353 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1962); Dorsey v. Muilenburg,
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Mercantile, Inc.,97 it was error for an expert witness to assume that an
explosion took place, absent positive testimony that an explosion actually
occurred. In Sampson v. Missouri Pacific Railway,98 the court indicated
that expert testimony on loss of future wages was admissible only when
based on the "use of facts in reasonable calculations," 99 and not when
formed from "'speculation and conjecture.' "100
While the use of hypothetical questions has been criticized, 0 1 it ap-
pears that their purpose, revealing the facts upon which the expert bases
his opinion, is justifiable under the assistance to the jury test. If the jury
is to evaluate fairly the expert's testimony, knowledge of the basis of the
testimony is essential. It is arguable, of course, that the purpose of the
hypothetical question can be realized better through cross-examination of
the expert as to the basis of his opinion.102
The evidentiary basis required for facts assumed by an expert witness
can be supplied by a number of sources. It can be supplied by the personal
observation of other witnesses,'103 by substantial circumstantial evidence, 04
by photographs,0 5 x-rays,06 or other physical evidence,10 7 by cross-exami-
nation, 08 or by the testimony of another expert witness if the opinion of
the other expert is in evidence.109 Further, rational inferences drawn from
the testimony may be included in the hypothetical. 1 0 Whether a sufficient
evidentiary basis exists to include a fact in a hypothetical question is a
legal question to be decided by the trial court."' The trial judge is given
discretion in making this determination. 2
Just as some facts cannot be included in a hypothetical question, some
345 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Mo. 1961); Craddock v. Greenberg Merc., Inc., 297 S.W.2d
541, 548 (Mo. 1957); Ortiz v. Ortiz, 465 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Mo. App., K.C. 1971).
97. 297 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1957).
98. 560 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
99. Id. at 589.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., C. McCoRmcn, LAv oF EvmENCE § 16 (2d ed. 1972).
102. Id. § 17. See FED. R. EvID. 705, Notes of Advisory Committee.
103. See cases cited note 91 supra.
104. Heppner v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 297 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Mo. 1956).
105. Chambers v. City of Kansas City, 446 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Mo. 1969); Skelton
v. General Candy Co., 539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
106. Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967).
107. Penn v. Hartman, 525 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); Ortiz v.
Ortiz, 465 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Mo. App., K.C. 1971); Anderson v. Electric Storage
Battery Co., 433 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Mo. App., K.C. 1968).
108. Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961).
109. Hornberger v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 353 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1962);
Lineberry v. Robinett, 446 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Mo. App., K.C. 1969).
110. Schmitt v. Pierce, 844 S.W.2d 120, 130 (Mo. En Banc 1961); Winters v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
111. Conlon v. Roeder, 418 S.W.2d 152, 159 (Mo. 1967); Schmitt v. Pierce,
344 S.W.2d 120, 130 (Mo. En Banc 1961); Cohen v. Archibald Plumbing & Heating
Co., 555 S.W.2d 676, 681 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Skelton v. General Candy Co.,
539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Sides v. Mannino, 347 S.W.2d 391,
395 (Mo. App., St. L. 1961).
112. See cases cited note 111 supra.
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facts must be included."13 While every fact in evidence need not be in-
cluded in a hypothetical, 114 some facts are so essential that failure to in-
clude them in a hypothetical will constitute error."15 For example, in Odum
v. Cejas,"O6 a medical malpractice action concerning the postoperative care
received by a patient, plaintiff's counsel utilized a lengthy hypothetical
question in examining an expert witness. In spite of the question's length,
it was held to be "substantially and materially incomplete and inade-
quate,"1 17 because it failed to include the fact that the postoperative care
had included maintenance of adequate urinary drainage, which the court
found, under the circumstances, to be the "essence of postoperative care.""18
Thus, if the omission of a fact from a hypothetical would render the ex-
pert's response to that question irrelevant to the facts upon which the
jury must render its decision, then it is error to omit that fact from the
hypothetical.119 The error may be cured, however, where the omitted fact
is elicited on cross-examination.1 20
A variety of tests or standards have been used by Missouri courts in
determining which facts must be included in a hypothetical question. In
Winter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,1 21 the St. Louis Court of Appeals indi-
cated that "the facts essential to . . . [the expert's] opinion must be as-
sumed in the question."' 22 In Odum, the Springfield Court of Appeals held
that "a question of this character must fairly hypothesize the material facts
reasonably relevant to, and justly presenting, the questioner's theory of
113. Klaesener v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 498 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Mo. 1973); Wint-
ers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Odum
v. Cejas, 510 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974); West v. Jack Cooper Transp.
Co., 372 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Mo. App., K.C. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 381 S.W.2d
872 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
114. Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 130 (Mo. En Banc 1961); Hunter v.
St. Louis S.W. Ry., 315 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Mo. 1958); Golden v. National Utils. Co.,
356 Mo. 84, 90-92, 201 S.W.2d 292, 295-96 (1947); Skelton v. General Candy Co.,
539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416
S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967); Gavan v. H.D. Tousley Co., 395 S.W.2d
266, 270 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965); Sneed v. Goldsmith, 343 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1961).
115. See cases cited note 114 supra. See also text accompanying notes 113-29
infra, discussing which facts rise to a level of essentiality.
116. 510 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974).
117. Id. at 222.
118. Id.
119. In other words, does the existence of the omitted fact make the question
at issue different from the one upon which the expert expressed an opinion? If so,
then the expert's opinion can be considered irrelevant to the issue the jury is to
decide. See Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
120. Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260, 267 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961),
indicates that the evidentiary basis for facts assumed in a hypothetical can be
provided by cross-examination. It also appears that calling an expert's attention to
an omitted fact on cross-examination would have the effect of curing the defective
hypothetical if the expert testifies that the omitted fact would not change his
opinion. See West v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 372 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 381 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
121. 554 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
122. Id. at 573.
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the case."'123 The Missouri Supreme Court, in Klaesener v. Schnucks Mar-
kets, Inc.,12 4 stated that a hypothetical must include "substantially all of
the material facts relating to the subject on which the judgment of the
witness is sought."125 Literally applied, the language of the tests in each of
the above cases does not necessarily yield similar results. In fact, the quo-
tations illustrate how difficult it would be to formulate any single test
which could be utilized to determine which facts are essential to a hypo-
thetical.
The unifying concept used by Missouri courts, which tends to harmo-
nize the decisions, is the assistance to the jury test. Such a standard is often
utilized by the courts in determining the propriety of a hypothetical ques-
tion.126 In Hunter v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway,127 the Missouri Su-
preme Court explained:
The questioner may frame his hypothetical on his own theory
and may not necessarily include all of the material facts shown in
evidence. The questioner may elicit an opinion on any combi-
nation or sets of facts he may choose, if the question propounded
fairly hypothesizes facts the evidence tends to prove and fairly pre-
sents the questioner's theory so that the answer will be of assistance
to the jury on the issue.'28
The determinative factor in assessing the necessity of including a fact in a
hypothetical question is whether omission of the fact would deprive the
expert's answer to the question of its value to the jury. In other words,
the determination would be whether omission of a particular fact would
cause the set of facts upon which the expert stated his opinion to be so
different from the facts of the case at issue that the opinion of the expert
would be of no assistance to the jury in reaching a conclusion on the
issues. For example, in Odum v. Cejas,2 9 it could be said that the expert's
opinion on postoperative care which did not assume adequate urinary
drainage was essentially irrelevant to postoperative care which included
adequate urinary drainage. Therefore, the question was improper because
any answer to it could not assist the jury in determining the case at issue.
Litigants should be aware of two mechanisms Missouri courts have
adopted that serve to alleviate some of the consequences of improperly
123. 510 S.W.2d at 222.
124. 498 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1973).
125. Id. at 559.
126. Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co., 391 S.W.2d 315, 326 (Mo. 1965);
Phillips v. Shaw, 381 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. 1964); Stipp v. Tsutomi Karasawa, 318
S.W.2d 172, 174 (Mo. 1958); Summers v. Tavern Rock Sand Co., 315 S.W.2d 201,
206 (Mo. 1958); Hunter v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 315 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Mo. 1958);
Holtmeyer v. Scherer, 546 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Sneed v. Gold-
smith, 343 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961).
127. 315 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1958).
128. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
129. 510 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974). For a discussion of the facts of
Odum, see text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
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drawn hypothetical questions. First, the trial court is given significant dis-
cretion in determining which facts need to be included in a hypothetical.130
So great is the discretion that answers to inadequately drawn hypotheticals
may sometimes be allowed by the trial judge.' 31 As has been noted often
by the supreme court, "'trial courts may exercise a sound discretion.., and
the omission of some facts or a violation of the general rules does not
necessarily preclude an answer.' "132 Second, Missouri courts have held that
before error in the drawing of a hypothetical question will be preserved
for appeal, the party must object specifically to the question and indicate
which facts should or should not be included. 3 3 Because the objecting
party must be specific as to his objection, the offering party will have the
opportunity to amend his hypothetical question by adding or deleting
facts.184
Besides drawing a factual conclusion based on other evidence, an
expert may testify to personal observation. When an expert witness testifies
from personal observation he need not testify from a hypothetical ques-
tion.13 5 Frequently, however, hearsay problems will arise when the expert
attempts to state the basis for his opinion. The problems arise when the
expert has based his opinion on a fact communicated to him by a third
party. When the opinion of an expert is based on information which to
him is hearsay, the proper procedure is to submit independent evidence of
the fact and then to submit that fact to the expert in the form of a hypo-
thetical question.13 6
The most common instance in which the hearsay problem arises oc-
curs when a treating physician is testifying to the cause or the severity of
180. See cases cited note 111 supra.
181. See cases cited note 111 supra.
132. Conlon v. Roeder, 418 S.W.2d 152, 159 (Mo. 1967) (quoting Schmitt v.
Pierce, 844 S.W.2d 120, 180 (Mo. En Banc 1961)). See also cases cited note 111 supra.
133. Conlon v. Roeder, 418 S.W.2d 152, 159 (Mo. 1967); Harp v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Mo. 1963); Dorsey v. Muilenburg, 345 S.W.2d 134, 138(Mo. 1961); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 130 (Mo. En Banc 1961); McKinley
v. Vize, 563 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Skelton v. General Candy
Co., 539 S.W.2d 605, 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Lindsey v. P.J. Hamill Transfer
Co., 404 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo. App., St. L. 1966); Denney v. Spot Martin, Inc.,
328 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Mo. App., Spr. 1959). See also Stipp v. Tsutomi Karasawa,
318 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Mo. 1958) (discusses offer of proof requirements and theirjustifications in relation to expert testimony); Sides v. Mannino, 347 S.W.2d 391,
396 (Mo. App., St. L. 1961) (erroneous ruling apparently required to be "harm-
ful" before appeal can be successful).
134. Cohen v. Archibald Plumbing & Heating Co., 555 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1977). See also cases cited note III supra.
135. Sneed v. Goldsmith, 343 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961). See also
Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 390-91 (Mo. 1963); Dolan v. D.A.
Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967); Gavan v. H.D. Tousley
Co., 395 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965).
136. Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Div. ACF Indus., Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 750-51(Mo. 1968); Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo. En Banc
1962); Griffin v. Evans Elec. Constr. Co., 529 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Mo. App., K.C.
1975); Ortiz v. Ortiz, 465 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Mo. App., K.C. 1971); Anderson v.
Electric Storage Battery Co., 443 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Mo. App., K.C. 1968).
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a patient's injuries. Frequently his opinion will be based on statements
made to him by the patient concerning the cause of the accident or the
patient's medical history. Missouri courts traditionally have allowed the
expert to testify with respect to statements made by the patient regarding
present physical symptoms, but have refused to allow the expert to state
the information he obtained from the patient regarding past history or
causation.137 The often stated rule was noted by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division of ACF Industries, Inc.:138
A physician, in stating his expert opinion on a patient's condi-
tion, may testify to what he personally observed and also to what
the patient said (an exception to the hearsay rule) concerning his
present, existing symptoms and complaints. However, he may not
base his opinion upon or testify to statements of the patient with
respect to past physical conditions, circumstances surrounding the
injury or the manner in which the injury was received. 1'9
The rule is justified under the assistance to the jury analysis if the
hearsay rules are valid. Assuming that hearsay is not trustworthy evi-
dence,140 then the opinion of an expert based on such evidence would also
be untrustworthy, and thus not a desirable type of assistance for the jury.
A patient's statements to his treating physician regarding his present medi-
cal condition, however, have been excepted from the hearsay rule because
such statements are allegedly more trustworthy.' 41 Therefore, an expert is
allowed to formulate his opinion upon such statements without causing
his opinion to be untrustworthy and of no assistance to the jury.
Unlike the subject matter limitations the courts have imposed on
expert testimony, the restrictions on expert testimony which deal with its
foundation are logically founded in the purpose of expert testimony. The
basis upon which an expert testifies, the requirements regarding hypotheti-
cal questions, and the application of hearsay restrictions to the expert when
giving his reasons for his opinion all serve to assure that the expert testi-
mony admitted assists the jury. While some may argue that the hypotheti-
cal question is unnecessary, or that a patient's statements regarding the
cause of his injuries are trustworthy, each of the requirements is, at least
theoretically, justifiable under the assistance to the jury analysis.
137. Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Div. ACF Indus., Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 750
(Mo. 1968); Harp v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 370 S.W.2d 387, 392-93 (Mo. 1963); Schears
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 322 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Hunter v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry., 315 S.W.2d 689, 695-96 (Mo. 1958). But see Erbes v. Union Elec.
Co., 353 S.W.2d 659, 667 (Mo. 1962).
138. 429 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. 1968).
139. Id. at 751 (quoting Holmes v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1178, 1188,
257 S.W.2d 922, 926 (1953)). See cases cited note 137 supra.
140. That is, it is not the type of evidence one would want a jury to rely on.
141. This is because the statements are made to a physician in order to re-
ceive treatment. See C. McCoamscn, LAw or EvmENc § 292 (2d ed. 1972).
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Because of limitations that have been placed on the use of expert
testimony, the use of the assistance to the jury test alone provides little
guidance as to the admissibility of expert testimony.
By adopting narrow limitations on expert testimony and restricting
qualification of witnesses as experts, by limiting the subject matters upon
which experts can testify, and by limiting the foundation upon which ex-
perts can testify, the courts have sometimes lost sight of the real purpose
of expert testimony. That purpose is to assist the jury in rendering a correct
verdict. While the considerations evaluated by the courts under many of
these limitations are by no means irrelevant and in fact are important, the
courts, by discussing the limitations in isolation from the purpose of expert
testimony, have rendered unnecessarily restrictive and confusing decisions.
In the future, courts would do well to construe traditional limitations
in light of the assistance to the jury test. Under such an approach, the
courts would construe the limitations so that the admission of expert testi-
mony is prevented only when expert testimony would be of little or no as-
sistance to the jury. While such an approach may not lead to more liberal
admission of expert testimony, it would certainly emphasize the purpose
for which expert testimony is allowed. Further, such an approach would
require attorneys to demonstrate to the court what an expert had to offer
in the way of assistance to the jury, and thereby minimize potential abuses
of expert testimony.
The assistance to the jury test dearly should become the focus of the
courts' inquiry into the admissibility of expert testimony. The issues now
discussed by the courts in considering limitations imposed on the use of
expert testimony should be discussed only in reference to whether such
matters deprive the testimony of its beneficial value to the jury. In that
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